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INSTITUTIONAL POSTURE: A
MEASUREMENT FOR GOOD FAITH IN
AN IRS SUMMONS ENFORCEMENT
PROCEEDING
I. Introduction
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) is authorized to
issue administrative summonses' to taxpayers and third parties
pursuant to section 76022 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC or
Code). The summons may be used in two instances: to compel
presentation of books and records to verify the content of any re-
turn that has been filed; or, to prepare a return where none has
been filed.3 Frequent disputes have arisen between the IRS and
taxpayers, who claimed that IRS special agents have exceeded
their section 7602 summons power."
1. The extent of an administrative agency's investigatory or inquisitional powers to re-
quire disclosure, either through inspection of records or testimony of witnesses, depends
upon the grant of power given by statute. The agency is usually held to have the power to
demand disclosure of information as to matters within its competency, but compulsion must
be exerted only through the judicial process.
Courts are liberal in permitting an administrative agency full exercise of its powers to
subpoena records and will generally enforce a subpoena as long as the documents contain
evidence which relates to the matter in question and the scope of the subpoena is within
constitutional constraints. 1 AM. JuR. 2d Administrative Law §§ 85-91 (1962); 2 AM. JUR. 2d
Administrative Law §§ 263-264 (1962).
2. IRC Section 7602. EXAMINATION OF BOOKS AND WITNESSES.
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any
person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the
Secretary is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant
or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care
of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for
tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary may deem
proper, to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in the summons
and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony,
under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be rele-
vant or material to such inquiry.
3. Id.
4. Most taxpayers claimed that the § 7602 summonses were being used to gather infor-
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In United States v. LaSalle National Bank,5 the Supreme
Court, attempting to resolve a conflict among the circuits' concern-
ing the enforceability of the section 7602 summons, formulated a
two-pronged test7 to determine the validity of a section 7602 sum-
mons. The Supreme Court also created an "institutional posture"8
standard to measure the Service's good faith issuance and use of
the summons. This Note will, after discussing the procedural and
historical background of LaSalle, examine and evaluate the impact
of LaSalle and its interpretation by various circuit courts.
II. Procedural Background of the Section 7602
Summons Power
The Examinations Division and the Criminal Investigation Divi-
sion are the two principal investigative arms within the IRS.0 Rev-
enue agents from the Examinations Division review tax returns
and recommend adjustments to establish a basis for tax liability.10
Special agents from the Criminal Investigation Division gather evi-
dence required to prove criminal violations and assess penalties for
civil fraud, negligence and delinquency." Joint investigations re-
sult in an overlap between the responsibilities of each division." In
the event that both a revenue agent and a special agent are as-
signed to an investigation, the revenue agent determines the tech-
nical adjustments and correct tax liability" and the special agent,
who bears primary responsibility,1 4 issues the summonses. 15
mation in order to prepare referrals for criminal prosecution to the Department of Justice.
5. 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
6. See notes 42-46 infra and accompanying text.
7. 437 U.S. at 318. See note 63 infra and accompanying text.
8. Id. at 316.
9. "As part of a planned reorganization, the IRS has announced its intention to redesig-
nate the Audit Division and the Intelligence Division as the Examinations Division and the
Criminal Enforcement Division, respectively. IRS News Release, Feb. 6, 1978." Id. at 300
n.1.
The Intelligence Division is also referred to as the Criminal Investigation Division.
10. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 4565.31(2) (1976), reprinted in II INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL - AUDIT (CCH) [hereinafter cited as IRM].
11. IRM 4565.31(4).
12. IRM T 4565.31(1).
13. IRM 4565.32.
14. Id.
15. The Internal- Revenue Service's interpretation authority is based on IRC § 7805
which permits the IRS "to prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement"
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The basic IRS summons power is detailed in sections 7601-7611
of the IRC. Section 760116 grants the Treasury Department broad
investigative powers. Section 7602,'7 which grants general sum-
mons power, authorizes the examination of records and witnesses.
The accompanying section of the Treasury Regulations specifies
which IRS officers and employees are authorized to issue sum-
monses.18 Section 7603's describes the service of the summons, and
of the Internal Revenue Code. Treas. Reg. § 301.7602-1(c) (1973) authorizes both revenue
agents and special agents to issue summonses.
16. IRC Section 7601. CANVASS OF DISTRICTS FOR TAXABLE PERSONS AND
OBJECTS.
(a) General Rule-The Secretary shall, to the extent he deems it practicable,
cause officers or employees of the Treasury Department to proceed, from time to
time, through each internal revenue district and inquire after and concerning all per-
sons therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax, and all persons own-
ing or having the care and management of any objects with respect to which any tax
is imposed.
17. See note 2 supra.
18. Treas. Reg. § 301.7602-1(c) (1973) Persons who may issue summons.
The following officers and employees of the Internal Revenue Service are authorized
to issue a summons pursuant to sections 6420(e)(2), 6421(f)(2), 6424(d)(2), 6427(e)(2),
or 7602
(1) Regional commissioners and district directors.
(2) Inspection: Assistant Commissioner; director and assistant directors, Internal
Security Division; regional inspectors; and all internal security inspectors.
(3) Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms: Assistant regional commissioners.
(4) Intelligence: Director; assistant director; assistant regional commissioners; ex-
ecutive assistants to assistant regional commissioner; chiefs, Review and Conference
Staff; reviewer-conferees; chiefs and assistant chiefs of divisions, branches and sec-
tions; group supervisors; and special agents of the national, regional and district
offices.
(5) International Operations: Director; assistant director; chiefs of divisions,
branches and groups; special agents; internal revenue agents; estate tax examiners;
revenue service representatives; and assistant revenue service representatives.
(6) Collection: Chiefs and assistant chiefs of divisions; chiefs and assistant chiefs
of the Delinquent Accounts and Returns Branches; group supervisors; and revenue
officers.
(7) Audit: Chiefs of divisions and branches; group supervisors; internal revenue
agents; and estate tax examiners.
19. IRC Section 7603. SERVICE OF SUMMONS.
A summons issued under section 6420(e)(2), 6421(f)(2), 6424(d)(2), 6427(g)(2), or
7602 shall be served by the Secretary, by an attested copy delivered in hand to the
person to whom it is directed, or left at his last and usual place of abode; and the
certificate of service signed by the person serving the summons shall be evidence of
the facts it states on the hearing of an application for the enforcement of the sum-
mons. When the summons requires the production of books, papers, records, or other
data, it shall be sufficient if such books, papers, records, or other data are described
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its companion Regulations explain that the power to serve the
summons is conferred on the same parties who have issuance
power.20
Although the IRS is given broad discretionary authority regard-
ing the issuance of a section 7602 summons, there is no provision
in the Code permitting enforcement by the Service of its own sum-
21 2mons. Pursuant to section 7604,22 the power to enforce the sum-
mons is vested in the federal district court for the district within
which the person summoned resides or may be found.
The Tax Reform Act of 197623 added section 760924 to remedy
with reasonable certainty.
20. Treas. Reg. § 301.7603-1(b). See note 18 supra.
21. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
22. IRC Section 7604. ENFORCEMENT OF SUMMONS.
(a) Jurisdiction of District Court.-If any person is summoned under the internal
revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, records, or other data,
the United States district court for the district in which such person resides or is
found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testi-
mony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data. [Section 7604(a) is sub-
stantially the same as the authority granted in § 7402(b).]
(b) Enforcement.-Whenever any person summoned under section 6420(e)(2),
6421(f)(2), 6424(d)(2), 6427(g)(2), or 7602 neglects or refuses to obey such summons,
or to produce books, papers, records, or other data, or to give testimony, as required,
the Secretary may apply to the judge of the district court or to a United States com-
missioner for the district within which the person so summoned resides or is found
for an attachment against him as for a contempt. It shall be the duty of the judge or
commissioner to hear the application, and, if satisfactory proof is made, to issue an
attachment, directed to some proper officer, for the arrest of such person, and upon
his being brought before him to proceed to a hearing of the case; and upon such
hearing the judge or the United States commissioner shall have power to make such
order as he shall deem proper, not inconsistent with the law for the punishment of
contempts, to enforce obedience to the requirements of the summons and to punish
such person for his default or disobedience.
"Because § 7604(a) contains no provision specifying the procedure to be followed in
invoking the court's jurisdiction, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply. The pro-
ceedings are instituted by filing a complaint, followed by answer and hearing. If the
taxpayer has contumaciously refused to comply with the administrative summons and
the Service fears he may flee the jurisdiction, application for the sanctions available
under § 7604(b) might be made simultaneously with the filing of the complaint."
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 n.18 (1964) (citation omitted).
23. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1976)).
24. IRC Section 7609. SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR THIRD-PARTY SUMMONSES.
[in part provides]
(a) Notice.-
(1) In General If-
(A) any summons described in subsection (c) is served on any person who is a
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some difficulties previously encountered with third party sum-
monses. This new section applies to summonses issued after Feb-
ruary 28, 19772" and requires that any party identified in the sum-
moned records be given notice of such within three days of service
and no later than the fourteenth day prior to the examination of
the records. 6 In addition, section 7609 provides the identified
party with a statutory right to intervene 27 in any subsequent en-
forcement proceeding petitioned for by the Service under section
7604.28
third-party recordkeeper, and
(B) the summons requires the production of any portions of records made or
kept of the business transactions or affairs of any person (other than the person sum-
moned) who is identified in the description of the records contained in the summons,
then notice of the summons shall be given to any person so identified within 3 days of
the day on which such service is made, but no later than the 14th day before the day
fixed in the summons as the day upon which such records are to be examined. Such
notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the summons which has been served, and
shall contain directions for staying compliance with the summons under subsection
(b)(2).
(b) Right to Intervene; Right to Stay Compliance.-
(1) Intervention.-Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law, any person who
is entitled to notice of a summons under subsection (a) shall have the right to inter-
vene in any proceeding with respect to the enforcement of such summons under sec-
tion 7604.
(2) Right to Stay Compliance.-Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law, any
person who is entitled to notice of a summons under subsection (a) shall have the
right to stay compliance with the summons if, not later than the 14th day after the
day such notice is given in the manner provided in subsection (a)(2)-
(A) notice in writing is given to the person summoned not to comply with the
summons, and
(B) a copy of such notice not to comply with the summons is mailed by regis-
tered or certified mail to such person and to such office as the Secretary may direct in
the notice referred to in subsection (a)(1).
25. Section 1205(c) of Pub. L. 94-455, as amended by Pub. L. 94-528, § 2(b), Oct. 17,
1976, 90 Stat. 2483, provided that: "The amendments made by this section (enacting sec-
tions 7609 and 7610] shall apply with respect to any summons issued after February 28,
1977."
26. See note 24 supra.
27. Id.
28. Although the Service's summons power is not mentioned in IRC §§ 6103(i) and
7122(a) these sections are essential to any consideration of the topic. Section 6103(i) con-
cerns the procedure and scope of disclosure of information from and about taxpayers to the
Department of Justice in cases not related to tax administration.
IRC Section 6103(i). Disclosure to Federal Officers or Employees for Administration
of Federal Laws Not Relating to Tax Administration.-[in part provides]
(1) Nontax Criminal Investigation.-
(A) Information from Taxpayer.-A return or taxpayer return information
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The Service's internal procedure for formal referrals 9 to the De-
partment of Justice is outlined in the Internal Revenue Manual.
Cases within the Service are referred by an investigating agent to
his immediate supervisor, and are subsequently reviewed by the
District Director. The referral is further reviewed by the Regional
Counsel's Office before the findings are forwarded to the Depart-
ment of Justice. 0 The Service's own administrative regulations
preclude the further issuance of summonses in criminal cases
pending before the Department of Justice, unless prior special
clearance has been granted by that department.31
III. The Historical Background of LaSalle
The scope of the Service's summons power has evolved from the
shall, pursuant to, and upon the grant of, an ex parte order by a Federal district court
judge as provided by this paragraph, be open, but only to the extent necessary as
provided in such order, to officers and employees of a Federal agency personally and
directly engaged in and solely for their use in, preparation for any administrative or
judicial proceeding (or investigation which may result in such a proceeding) pertain-
ing to the enforcement of a specifically designated Federal criminal statute (not in-
volving tax administration) to which the United States or such agency is or may be a
party.
See also, Benedict & Lupert, Federal Income Tax Returns - The Tension Between Gov-
ernment Access and Confidentiality, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 940, 954-64 (1979). IRC Section
7122(a) authorizes the IRS to negotiate a settlement in any civil or criminal tax case prior to
referral to the Department of Justice. After referral the Service loses this power and the
authority to make a compromise settlement shifts to the Department of Justice.
IRC Section 7122. COMPROMISES. [in part provides]
(a) Authorization.-The Secretary may compromise any civil or criminal case
arising under the internal revenue laws prior to reference to the Department of Jus-
tice for prosecution or defense; and the Attorney General or his delegate may com-
promise any such case after reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution or
defense.
29. Formal referrals are made not only in cases where the alleged evasion rises to a level
that necessitates criminal prosecution and therefore an inter-agency referral from the IRS
to the Department of Justice, but intra-agency referrals are necessary from the Examina-
tions Division to the Criminal Investigation Division to assess civil fraud penalties. For a
discussion of civil tax penalties, and in particular with regard to the civil fraud penalty see
Comment, Civil Tax Penalties: Changes and Recommendations, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 465,
486-98 (1978).
30. IRM 1 9621-31, reprinted in IRM 5 Administration (CCH).
31. IRM $ 9363.6. Criminal Cases Pending with Justice
No summons shall be issued in connection with a criminal case pending with the
Department of Justice either to obtain further information from the taxpayer or a
witness or to uncover assets to apply against assessed liabilities unless clearance is
first obtained from that Department through the District Counsel, and the Chief
Counsel.
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Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Powell32 and Don-
aldson v. United States.3
In Powell, a taxpayer challenged an administrative summons
that was issued to secure the production of records relating to tax
returns that had previously been audited, and for which the three
year statute of limitations had expired. 4 The Third Circuit refused
to enforce the summons absent a sufficient showing of probable
cause that a fraud had been committed.3 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the IRS
need not meet any standard of probable cause to obtain enforcement of [its]
summons, either before or after the three-year statute of limitations on or-
dinary tax liabilities has expired. [It] must show that the investigation will
be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be
relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within
the (Service's] possession, and that the administrative steps required by the
Code have been followed. ... 3
In Donaldson, a taxpayer challenged a third party summons ar-
guing that, if use of the summons could lead to a recommendation
that the taxpayer be criminally prosecuted, the summons should
not be enforced. The Supreme Court first acknowledged that if
the sole objective of an investigation was to obtain evidence for use
in a criminal prosecution, then the purpose was not a legitimate
one and enforcement may be denied. 8 Second, after reviewing the
Service's internal structure and procedure, the Supreme Court
found that Congress had authorized the use of the summons in in-
vestigating possible future criminal conduct.39 Furthermore, the
Court stated that the statute did not suggest that civil and crimi-
nal purposes be distinguished when the special agent entered the
investigation. 40 The Court held that a section 7602 summons could
be issued in aid of an investigation as long as it was issued in good
32. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
33. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
34. Once a return is filed IRC § 6501 provides for a three-year statute of limitations after
which no examination may be initiated. However, in cases of fraud or other criminal prose-
cutions IRC § 6531 provides a six-year statute of limitations.
35. 379 U.S. at 50.
36. Id. at 57-58.
37. 400 U.S. at 532.
38. Id. at 533.
39. Id. at 535.
40. Id.
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faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution.41
Donaldson created considerable confusion in the lower federal
courts as to the proper standard for determining the validity of a
section 7602 summons. Judicial interpretations of the concept of
"prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution" took three
forms:'" 1) before the agent formed a firm purpose to recommend
prosecution,4 8 2) before an intra-agency referral,"" or 3) before a
formal referral by the IRS to the Department of Justice.4 Courts
were also split in their determination of when the "sole objective"
of an investigation was to obtain evidence for use in a criminal
prosecution and was therefore a misuse of the summons power.
Most courts agreed with Donaldson that a summons may be utilized when a
proper civil purpose exists even though there is a possibility that the inves-
tigation will lead to criminal prosecution. Moreover, most of the courts that
have faced the issue have concluded that a pending non-tax criminal pro-
ceeding at the time of issuance of the summons does not mean that the
summons was issued for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use
in a criminal prosecution. On the other hand, the courts have applied widely
divergent tests in determining whether a summons has been issued "solely
for criminal prosecution." The Seventh Circuit considered the personal mo-
tivation of the agent as the correct legal test to determine whether a sum-
mons was issued solely for criminal prosecution; the Second Circuit rejected
this test as not representative of the Service's appropriate interest in the
determination of civil liability. The District of Columbia, Third and Sixth
Circuit Courts of Appeals have concluded that a sole criminal prosecution
purpose may exist when a Special Agent has formed a firm purpose to rec-
ommend prosecution, while the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held that
the purpose does not become solely for criminal prosecution until the Ser-
vice refers the case to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. 4"
The diversity among the circuits as to the circumstances under
41. Id. at 536.
42. Nuzum, LaSalle National Bank and the Judicial Defense to the Enforcement of an
Administrative Summons, 32 TAx LAW. 383, 387-90 (1979). This article contains a valuable
discussion of judicial defenses and developments leading to the LaSalle decision and its
effect on the Powell standards.
43. United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 932 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Wall
Corp., 475 F.2d 893, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
44. United States v. Haddad, 527 F.2d 537, 538 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
974 (1976); United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 1973), affd per curiam on
rehearing en banc, 487 F.2d 1335 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974).
45. United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977).
46. Nuzum, supra note 42, at 389-90 (footnotes omitted).
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which a section 7602 summons will be valid induced the Supreme
Court to supplement Donaldson with LaSalle.47
IV. United States v. LaSalle National Bank and the
Institutional Posture Standard
In LaSalle, the Supreme Court reversed a Seventh Circuit deci-
sion48 which had denied enforcement of an IRS summons issued by
a special agent. The Seventh Circuit had affirmed the district
court's finding that the summons was issued "solely for the pur-
pose of unearthing evidence of criminal conduct."' 9 The special
agent had requested to be assigned to the case because of informa-
tion he had received from an informant involved in an unrelated
investigation. The taxpayer's return disclosed rental property
which the IRS determined was held in trust by the LaSalle Na-
tional Bank. The special agent issued two section 7602 summonses
to the trustee bank requesting verification of income and expenses
relating to the trust. A bank vice president appeared in response to
the summonses, but refused to comply with the summonses.
The Service initiated an enforcement proceeding in the district
court to compel the bank to comply with the summonses. Although
the special agent had made no, recommendation or report about
the case to his superiors, the district court held that the sum-
monses could not be enforced because at the time of their issuance,
the agent's intent was to use 'them improperly, "solely for the pur-
pose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution."50 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed,61 finding that the summonses had been
47. 437 U.S. at 299.
48:" United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 554 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1977).
49. 437 U.S. at 299 (citing United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 1 9407, at 84,073 (N.D.Ill. 1976)).
50. Id. at 304 (citing United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9407, at
84,072).
The special agent had told one of the taxpayer's attorneys that the investigation "was
strictly related to criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code." Thereafter, the tax-
payer contended that although he bore the burden of proving that enforcement of the sum-
mons would be an abuse of process, he did not have to show that the summons served no
civil purpose. The taxpayer argued that his burden was to show that the summonses had not
been issued in good faith because their sole purpose Was to gather evidence for a criminal
prosecution. The district court agreed and focused on the agent's personal motivation and
found that the absence of a formal referral for' criminal prosecution was irrelevant. Id. at
303-04.
51. 554 F.2d at 302.
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issued in bad faith.52 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.53
At the outset, the Supenie Court distinguished Donaldson from
LaSalle by stating that in Donaldson the issue was the mere po-
tentiality of criminal prosecution whereas in LaSalle the district
court found that the special agent was investigating with the sole
intent of unearthing evidence of criminal conduct.54 The Court de-
termined that the question presented in LaSalle was "whether this
finding necessarily leads to the conclusion that the summonses
were not issued in good-faith pursuit of the congressionally author-
ized purposes of § 7602.""
The Court acknowledged that Congress had created a law en-
forcement system in which criminal and civil elements were "in-
herently intertwined."" In view of the fact that tax fraud investi-
gations were not categorized into civil and criminal components,
any limitation upon the section 7602 summons power must reflect
this statutory premise.
The Court recognized, however, that although the criminal and
civil aspects of a tax fraud case begin to diverge upon the recom-
mendation of criminal prosecution to the Department of Justice,
the separation is never total, and the government does not of ne-
cessity sacrifice its interest in civil tax liability upon commence-
ment of a criminal prosecution.5 7 Prior to a recommendation to the
Department of Justice, the IRS must use its summons authority
according to the good faith standard set forth in Powell." Good
faith, as defined by the Supreme Court, is not determined by look-
ing at the agent's personal intent or motivation but rather "by an
52. The Seventh Circuit approved the district court's factual findings and its application
of Donaldson. Id. at 309.
53. 434 U.S. 996 (1977).
54. 437 U.S. at 307.
55. Id. at 308.
56. Id. at 309.
57. Id. at 311-12. However, there is a policy to restrain the IRS summons authority upon
formal referral for criminal prosecution to the Department of Justice. This is in keeping
with the policy that the summons power of § 7602 is not available to broaden the scope of
criminal discovery. Id. See note 31 supra.
58. The Powell criteria are: (1) that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a
legitimate purpose; (2) that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose; (3) that the infor-
mation sought is not already within the Service's possession; and (4) that the administrative
measures required by the Code have been followed. 379 U.S. at 57-58. See note 36 supra
and accompanying text.
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examination of the institutional posture of the IRS.""
The Court in LaSalle found that the burden of disproving the
existence of a valid civil tax purpose was on those opposing en-
forcement and although the burden was heavy, the good faith test
should remain the standard. The Service's good faith would be
subject to question where there was an unnecessary delay before
referral or where the Service was being used as an information
gathering agency. 0
The language employed by the Supreme Court in its discussion
of good faith is of great importance. In its analysis the Court dis-
cussed the use of a section 7602 summons but did not narrow its
discussion to the issuance of the summons. Presumably, use is
broader than issuance, and could include issuance as well as en-
forcement."' Arguably, if use includes both issuance and enforce-
ment, the institutional posture of the agency should be examined
in both instances."'
The distinction between the Court's interpretation of the terms
use and issuance further emerges in the language of the two-
pronged test established in LaSalle:
First, the summons must be issued before the Service recommends to the
Department of Justice that a criminal prosecution, which reasonably would
relate to the subject matter of the summons, be undertaken. Second, the
Service at all times must use the summons authority in good-faith pursuit
of the congressionally authorized purposes of § 7602. This second prerequi-
site requires the Service to meet the Powell standards of good faith. It also
requires that the Service not abandon in an institutional sense ... the pur-
suit of civil tax determination or collection."
59. 437 U.S. at 316.
An examination of institutional posture is in essence a good faith inquiry, the purpose of
which "is to determine whether the agency is honestly pursuing the goals of § 7602 by issu-
ing the summons." Id.
60. Id. at 317. See note 28 supra and note 91 infra.
61. Id. at 312-18.
62. For example, if the IRS made a formal recommendation to the Department of Jus-
tice after issuance of a § 7602 summons, but prior to enforcement of the summons, the
recommendation might indicate a change in institutional posture and preclude enforcement,
even though the original issuance is found to have been made in good faith. See United
States v. Marine Midland Bank, 585 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978). Marine Midland examines the
good faith use of a § 7602 summons in the context of an intra-agency referral. See notes
127-31 infra and accompanying text.
63. 437 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).
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In applying the above test to the facts presented in LaSalle, the
Court determined first, that no recommendation had been made to
the Department of Justice, thereby satisfying the first prong, or
objective test. The Court then applied the Powell criteria and de-
cided that these did not preclude enforcement.4 The Court found
however, that the lower courts had not considered whether the
Service had abandoned its pursuit of the taxpayer's civil tax liabil-
ity in an institutional sense. On the record presented, the Court
was unable to conclude that such an abandonment had occurred
and therefore reversed the Seventh Circuit with instructions to re-
mand the case to the district court."5 The steps which the Court
took in applying its own test to the facts in LaSalle demonstrate
the approach to be taken in an enforcement proceeding. These
steps require a district court to proceed through the two-pronged
test enunciated in LaSalle even though the objective test or the
Powell criteria have already been satisfied.
In a terse dissent," four Justices disagreed with the majority as
to the scope of a section 7602 'summons and argued that the stat-
ute itself contained no limitations on the focus of the inquiry,
whether civil or criminal. In addition, the dissent argued that
"[t]he elusiveness of 'institutional good faith' as described by the
Court can produce little but endless discovery proceedings and
ultimate frustration of the fair administration of the Internal Rev-
enue Code."'67
Justice Stewart, writing in dissent, predicted the difficulty to be
encountered in trying to ascertain the institutional posture of the
Service and called instead for an objective test such as that sug-
gested by Judge Friendly's analysis of Donaldson in United States
v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. s Judge Friendly's objective test,
that the summons be issued prior to criminal recommendation, is
64. See notes 31 and 57 supra and accompanying text.
65. 437 U.S. at 318-19.
66. The Supreme Court was divided five to four in the LaSalle decision. The dissenting
opinion was written by Justice Stewart, and was joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Stevens.
67. 437 U.S. at 320.
68. 572 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978). The Second Circuit called for
"an objective test," prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution, "that would avoid a
need for determining the thought processes of special agents .. " Id. at 41.
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substantially the first prong of the majority's test in LaSalle.e9
The immediate result of LaSalle is that the Supreme Court has
reduced the challenges taxpayers can raise to IRS summonses by
eliminating consideration of the agent's personal motivation for
and objective in gathering evidence.7 0 The Supreme Court has
shifted the focus of the good faith inquiry from the individual
agent, regarded as the proper inquiry by the Seventh Circuit, to
the Service as an institution.7 1 Further, the Supreme Court speci-
fied that the recommendation after which a summons may not be
issued is the formal referral from the IRS to the Department of
Justice, thus agreeing with the interpretations of the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits.72 However, the extensive discovery proceedings an-
ticipated by the dissenters in LaSalle, is illustrated by the subse-
quent decisions of the Third Circuit.
A. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit's interpretation of LaSaUe requires an exami-
nation of the Genser trilogy.7 3 In Genser I,74 the defendants were
69. One of the major difficulties with an objective test based upon formal referral from
the IRS to the Department of Justice is that "[a]lthough the act of recommending prosecu-
tion to the Department of Justice provides a clear, concise, objective standard for determin-
ing if an IRS summons is invalid, the triggering of this standard is very late in the investiga-
tive chain.". Note, Proper Standard for Enforcing an IRS Section 7602 Summons: United
States v. LaSalle, 20 B.C. L. REv. 741, 756 (1979).
70. The material in this paragraph is suggested by Saltzman, Supreme Court's LaSalle
Decision Makes It Harder to Successfully Challenge a Summons, 49 J. TAx. 130, 133-34
(1978).
71. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
72. Saltzman, supra note 70, at 133-34.
73. United States v. Genser, 602 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Genser III); United States v. Genser, 595 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Genser II]; United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1978) [here-
inafter cited as Genser I].
74. 582 F.2d 292.
Genser I was not an enforcement proceeding but dealt instead with the suppression of
evidence obtained from a summons with which a third party had voluntarily complied. The
summonses were issued prior to the effective date of IRC § 7609 which otherwise would
have required that notice be given to the taxpayer and would have given the taxpayer a
statutory right to intervene. The Third Circuit, however, found sufficient grounds upon
which the taxpayers had standing to challenge the administrative summons. Id. at 305-06.
Furthermore, the fact that the summonses were already voluntarily complied with by the
third parties foregoing the necessity of an enforcement proceeding does not preclude the
remedy of suppression. The court in Genser I stated that a "summons is no less illegal
merely because it escapes detection at the investigatory stage. The prophylactic principles
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convicted by a jury for tax evasion and among the claims they as-
serted was that the government had procured some of its evidence
illegally through a section 7602 summons. The defendants argued
that the district court erred in not granting an evidentiary hearing
to establish that the summonses were issued after the government
had formed an intention to prosecute.7 5
The Third Circuit in Genser I, initially found that in enforce-
ment proceedings, it was necessary for the IRS to make a prelimi-.
nary showing of good faith based upon Powell.71 Upon such a
showing, the burden would shift to the party opposing enforcement
of the summons. After examining the record, the court found that
there was no indication as to the dates of the summonses and the
parties on whom they were served. The court remanded the pro-
ceeding to the district court in order to conduct an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the IRS summonses were issued in
good faith and prior to a recommendation for prosecution, as out-
lined in LaSalle. In making this determination to examine IRS
posture only at the time of issuance, the court of appeals was con-
fining itself to the facts of Genser. The summonses had already
been voluntarily complied with, and therefore no enforcement pro-
ceedings had been held, making it unnecessary to consider IRS
posture at the time of enforcement."
On remand, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing
in accordance with the court of appeals' instructions. The district
court concluded that none of the summonses employed during the
investigation were issued "solely for a criminal purpose. 7 8
The defendants challenged the district court's ruling on the
grounds that the court had denied the defendants adequate discov-
ery, and that the court had misconstrued the substantive require-
which operate at the enforcement level are equally appropriate to the trial stage, and sup-
pression is the only practical remedy at that point to cure the statutory abuse." Id. at 308.
See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
75. Id. at 294-95.
76. The Third Circuit in Genser I, 582 F.2d at 302, actually cites United States v. Mc-
Carthy, 514 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1975), in which the court formulated procedural guidelines for
enforcement proceedings, however the criteria listed were first announced in United States
v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58. See notes 36 and 58 supra.
77. See notes 24 and 74 supra and accompanying text.
78. 595 F.2d at 148 (quoting the unreported district court decision).
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ments of LaSalle. This challenge led to Genser II," where the
Third Circuit found that testimony and documents presented at
the evidentiary hearing were necessary to "explore the reaches of
LaSalle."0 The hearing revealed that by the time the special agent
substantially had completed his investigation, he had issued 106
summonses. During the next six months, while writing his final re-
port, he issued nine more. One month after the special agent had
filed his final report recommending prosecution, another agent as-
signed to the case issued one more summons. Approximately six
weeks after the special agent had filed his final report, the Office of
Regional Counsel formally referred the case to the Department of
Justice. The IRS issued no summonses after that referral.8 1 Tech-
nically, all of the summonses that had been issued satisfied the
first prong, objective test of LaSalle, because the summonses were
issued prior to the official referral.
As to the validity of the summons, the court in Genser II stated
that the existence of a general civil purpose for the investigation
did not end judicial inquiry. The Third Circuit refused to make'
the existence of a continuing civil purpose dispositive because this
"would impose an impossible burden of proof on the taxpayer."8'
The court deemed it necessary to concentrate on the purposes of
individual summonses rather than on the purpose of the general
investigation. This, however, does not require a district court to
correlate each summons to a civil purpose. An examination of this
nature would require inquiry into the intent of the individual
agent and under LaSalle, would not be binding on the IRS as an
institution. Therefore, the court concluded that "summonses is-
79. 595 F.2d 146.
80. Id. at 148.
81. [The special agent] substantially completed his investigation in March 1975. By
that time he had issued a total of 106 summonses under section 7602. During the next
six months, while writing his final report, he issued nine more summonses.
On October 31, 1975, approximately one month after [the special agent] filed his
final report recommending prosecution, another agent assigned to the case issued the
116th and final summons. Although the record is unclear, [the special agent's] recom-
mendation must have been reviewed by the district chief of the [Criminal Investiga-
tion Division] sometime between September and November 1975, because it reached
the Office of Regional Counsel in November or December of that year .... The Of-
fice of Regional Counsel formally referred the case to the Justice Department for
prosecution on December 12, 1975. Id. at 148-49.
82. Id. at 150.
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sued by an investigating agent before that agent recommended
prosecution would be virtually unassailable."83 Nevertheless, the
court went on to curtail what had been stated previously in refer-
ence to the insufficiency of a general civil purpose. The Third Cir-
cuit, in Genser II, concluded that even in a case where an agent
issued summonses after having recommended prosecution, the tax-
payer would still have the burden of proving not only a pre-
existing institutional commitment to prosecute but also a failure of
the summons to advance any civil purpose. 4 This additional re-
quirement means that unless the taxpayer can prove that there
was no civil purpose to the summons, the IRS can assert a continu-
ing, general interest in making a civil tax assessment, which would
be sufficient to show that the civil objective had not been
abandoned.85
Genser II also set forth guidelines for "minimum" discovery
which expanded the narrow scope of discovery usually afforded to
the party opposing an enforcement proceeding. The Third Circuit
stated that the taxpayer was permitted to learn the identities of
the examining agents, the nature of any contacts between these
agents and officials from the Department of Justice, and the chro-
nology of the investigation, including the dates of any intra-agency
recommendation or formal referrals for prosecution. If upon se-
curing this information the taxpayer demonstrated: 1) that the
summonses were issued after the investigating agents had recom-
mended prosecution, 2) that the examination had been inordi-
nately delayed, or 3) that IRS personnel had been in contact with
the Department of Justice, a district court could permit further
limited discovery. 6
83. Id. at 151.
84. Id.
85. The validity of the summons also assumes that the summons does not otherwise
appear to be deficient or illegal.
86. The taxpayer was entitled to
discover the identities of the investigating agents, the date the investigation began,
the dates the agent or agents filed reports recommending prosecution, the date the
district chief of the . . .Criminal Investigation Division reviewed the recommenda-
tion, the date the Office of Regional Counsel referred the matter for prosecution, and
the dates of all summonses issued under . . . § 7602. Furthermore, the taxpayer
should be entitled to discover the nature of any contacts, relating to and during the
investigation, between the investigating agents and officials of the Department of
Justice.
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In Genser II, the Third Circuit was troubled by the special
agent's five-month delay before filing his report and by the failure
of the district court to ascertain at what point the IRS, as an insti-
tution, had decided to initiate criminal prosecution. This concern
was heightened by the fact that the special agent had continued to
issue summonses during the period that he was writing his final
report recommending prosecution. The Third Circuit was also dis-
turbed because the district court had not determined whether the
summonses issued after an institutional commitment to prosecute
served no civil purpose. The court emphasized that an illegal sum-
mons could not be made valid by a general civil purpose and re-
manded the case for additional proceedings to determine the Ser-
vice's institutional posture.81
On remand, the district court concluded that all of the IRS sum-
monses were valid and that there had been no inordinate or ex-
traordinary delay in the investigation. The district court, however,
refused to find that "no summons was issued after the IRS formed
an institutional commitment to recommend prosecution."88
The defendant appealed contesting the validity of the sum-
monses on the ground that the Service's institutional commitment
to recommend prosecution was sufficient to render the summonses
invalid. In Genser III, the Third Circuit disagreed, stating:
The district court's statement about the Service's institutional commit-
ment, standing alone, offers no support to the appellants' contention. It is
not just an institutional commitment to recommend prosecution that ren-
ders a summons issued under § 7602 invalid; rather, it is the absence of a
civil purpose for that summons that triggers the LaSalle rule.8"
Where this information or other evidence introduced by the taxpayer reveals (1)
that the IRS issued summonses after the investigating agents recommended prosecu-
tion, (2) that inordinate and unexplained delays in the investigation transpired, or (3)
that the investigating agents were in contact with the Department of Justice, the
district court must allow the taxpayer to investigate further. In proper cases, this
investigation could include the opportunity to examine the IRS agents or officials
involved, or to discover documents. Such examination/discovery, however, should be
carefully tailored to meet the purpose of the inquiry. On the other hand, where this
information indicates that none of these three conditions are present, the district
court need inquire no further.
Id. at 152.
87. See generally Note, The Institutional Bad Faith Defense in the Enforcementlof
IRS Summonses, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 621, 626-28 (1980).
88. 602 F.2d at 71 (quoting the unreported district court decision).
89. Id.
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Thus, having found no inordinate delay, the district court was not
obligated to examine the individual summonses. The Third Cir-
cuit, concluding that the taxpayer had failed to disprove the actual
existence of a valid civil tax purpose, affirmed the district court's
grant of enforcement.
The Third Circuit in United States v. Serubo,90 decided shortly
after Genser III, confronted the problem created when the IRS is
used as an information-gathering agency. 1 The Supreme Court in
LaSalle had stated that "the good-faith standard will not permit
the IRS to become an information-gathering agency for other de-
partments, including the Department of Justice, regardless of the
status of criminal cases." 9
In Serubo, the special agent had received information from other
government agencies concerning the illegal activities of the tax-
payer. The special agent initiated a joint civil-criminal investiga-
tion on June 6, 1974, and from then until April 23, 1975, issued
twenty-two section 7602 summonses to third parties. The Third
Circuit designated this period as Phase I. During Phase I the spe-
cial agent had not decided whether to recommend prosecution and
did not transmit any evidence to other government agencies. How-
ever, on April 23, 1975, after receiving authorization, the IRS be-
gan to disclose information to the Department of Justice, which
had already begun its own investigation of the taxpayer. Thereaf-
ter, during the period designated by the court as Phase II," the
two investigations were coordinated by an attorney from the De-
partment of Justice. Between June 10, 1975 and January 22, 1976
thirteen more administrative summonses were issued. The special
agent did not recommend criminal prosecution until January 27,
1977." The taxpayer, at trial, sought suppression of the evidence
thus obtained.9
90. 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979).
91. See Winter, Changes Weighed in Taxpayer Privacy Law, 66 A.B.A. J. 831 (1980);
Comment, Federal Legislative Proposals for the Protection of Privacy, 8 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 773, 812-14 (1980); Note, The Use of Tax Returns in Non-Tax Prosecutions, 41 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 580 (1975); see note 28 supra.
92. 437 U.S. at 317.
93. 604 F.2d at 809.
94. Id. at 810.
95. Id.
96. This is similar to the situation in Genser I. See note 74 supra.
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At the outset the Third Circuit referred to the "gloss" 9 7 it had
placed upon the LaSalie test in Genser II. In Genser II, the Third
Circuit had held that the test of validity was not the existence of a
general civil purpose, but rather the purposes of the individual
summonses. However, because LaSalle required institutional aban-
donment of a civil purpose, the summonses issued before the agent
recommended criminal prosecution were presumed valid. In
Serubo, the summonses issued during Phase I would be presumed
valid and would not require individual examination. However,
those summonses issued during Phase II, when IRS agents were
acting under the supervision of the Department of Justice, re-
quired "individual determination of non-criminal purpose."9 Be-
cause the trial court did not pursue that inquiry and denied fur-
ther discovery, the court found it necessary to remand the
proceeding.9
In United States v. Garden State National Bank,100 the Third
Circuit was asked to determine what were the proper circum-
stances for the issuance of a section 7602 summons. In the district
court,'01 Judge Biunno had criticized IRS administrative appeal
procedures as being in bad faith, and remarked, that once a special
agent had been assigned to a case, the IRS did not institutionally
engage in compromise negotiations until after the Service decided
not to refer the case to the Department of Justice.'10 The district
court held, however, that the taxpayer had not requested a confer-
ence and concluded that the LaSalle burden was not met.
The Third Circuit affirmed the enforcement of the summons,103
97. 604 F.2d at 811.
98. Id. at 813.
99. The absence of discovery with respect to Phase II precluded that judicial determina-
tion. The defendants were entitled to discover what information was gathered as a result of
the Phase II subpoenas, how the information was handled after it was gathered, and how it
relates to the information gathered during Phase I, which concededly was presented to the
grand jury, and was intended for use at trial. Id.
100. 607 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1979). This investigation involves the same taxpayer as in
United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
822 (1978).
101. United States v. Garden State Nat'l Bank, 465 F. Supp. 437 (D.N.J. 1979).
102. Id. at 439-40. This is different from the situation contemplated by IRC § 7122(a)
where after referral the IRS loses its authority to compromise both criminal and civil as-
pects of a tax case and the authority to settle rests with the Department of Justice. See note
28,supra.
103. The Third Circuit affirmed enforcement of the summons on different grounds. 607
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but observed that "the refusal of the Service to enter into compro-
mise negotiations, standing alone, does not amount to 'bad
faith.' ,,10, The Third Circuit rejected the notion that enforcement
should be predicated either solely upon the basis of a request or
lack of a request for a compromise conference or wholly upon the
availability or unavailability of compromise negotiations. 10 5 The
court stated that within the context of Garden State, where it was
undisputed that neither a formal nor an intra-agency recommenda-
tion for prosecution was ever made, "the taxpayer bears an almost
impossible burden to resist enforcement of the summons."10
In order to clarify section 7602 summons enforcement procedure,
the Third Circuit delineated three discrete time periods with re-
spect to the time that a section 7602 summons can be issued: the
first, after formal recommendation, in which case "LaSalle conclu-
sively precludes further issuance of IRS summonses";1 07 the sec-
ond, during intra-agency referral, in which case "LaSalle imposes a
'heavy' burden on the taxpayer to prove bad faith";108 and the
third, where no recommendation has been made, in which case the
Third Circuit regards the summons as "virtually unassailable." 10' 9
The summons in Garden State was issued prior to any recom-
mendation by the special agent, thereby falling within the Third
Circuit's third time frame. Under these circumstances, the court
found it necessary to examine institutional posture only at the
time the summons was issued. However, the fact that the Third
Circuit distinguished two additional time frames indicates not only
the varying burdens upon the taxpayer, but also indicates that in-
stitutional posture ought to be examined at different points in time
F.2d at 64. The Court found
that [the taxpayer's] showing falls far short of defeating the presumption of validity
of a pre-recommendation summons. He has not carried the "heavy" burden imposed
by LaSalle, let alone the virtually insurmountable burden imposed by Genser I. Ac-
cordingly, since [the taxpayer] has failed to mount an effective challenge to the Gov-
ernment's Powell showing or to the institutional "good faith" of the Service, the...
subpoenas were properly enforced.
Id. at 74.
104. Id. at 73.
105. Id. at 66 n.7.
106. Id.. at 67.
107. Id. at 69-70.
108. Id. at 70.
109. Id., (quoting Genser II, 595 F.2d at 151).
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with respect to the status of contemplated criminal prosecution.
The greatest difficulties arise when a case is within the second time
frame, that is, at some stage of intra-agency referral. Under this
circumstance, the determination of institutional posture at time of
issuance alone might be insufficient and should perhaps be ex-
amined at the time the enforcement proceedings are brought, or at
the time enforcement of the summons is to be ordered.1
In United States v. Amerada Hess Corp.,"' the Third Circuit
strictly applied what it termed the "LaSalle-Genser" rule. In the
course of a civil audit of the corporation, a revenue agent obtained
additional information which led him to make a fraud referral to
the Criminal Investigation Division of the IRS. Representatives of
the corporate taxpayer were told that if the corporation preferred,
the civil audit would be suspended during the special agent's crim-
inal investigation; but, in the event that the corporation wanted to
have the civil audit continue, the documents requested by the rev-
enue agent would be separately identified from those documents
requested by the special agent.112
Thereafter, the special agent issued two summonses which the
corporation attempted to resist claiming that they were issued for
an improper criminal purpose. During the enforcement proceed-
ings a hearing was ordered during which the special agent testified
that the revenue agent's audit was suspended at the time the sum-
monses were issued but that the information sought by the sum-
monses was necessary to determine the corporation's tax liability
and that he had not yet decided whether or not to recommend
prosecution. The corporation argued that "the IRS had made an
institutional decision to divide its investigation into separate civil
and criminal segments, and that as a matter of law any summonses
issued at the behest of the special agent conducting the criminal
segment must be improper." ' s In response, the Third Circuit
stated that
the IRS has, in all cases, made an institutional decision to divide its investi-
gations into civil and criminal segments. The very existence of separate Ex-
110. This is suggested by United States v. Marine Midland Bank, 585 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.
1978). See notes 127-31 infra and accompanying text.
111. 619 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1980).
112. Id. at 983.
113. Id. at 985.
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aminations and Criminal Investigation Divisions demonstrates such a deci-
sion. But the fact that summonses are issued for criminal enforcement
purposes is not dispositive. The use of summonses after the abandonment
of a civil purpose is the evil against which the LaSalle-Genser rule guards.
It is undisputed that Amerada's civil liability is still an open question.,
In United States v. First National State Bank,115 the Third Cir-
cuit enforced two section 7602 summonses, reversing and affirming
in part a district court decision.1 6 Although in First National
State Bank the agent had not yet recommended prosecution, the
Service sent a letter to the taxpayer from the Deputy Commis-
sioner indicating that the taxpayers were the subject of a current
criminal investigation. The taxpayer contended that "the attitude
of the Deputy Commissioner is indicative of the institutional pos-
ture of IRS. 11 7 The court, in rejecting the taxpayers' argument,
pointed out that the Deputy Commissioner's reply was a standard
form letter and that
these letters prove no more than that there was a criminal investigation as
of the time they were both written, June 27, 1979. They do not imply that
there was a criminal investigation under way when the summonses were
served, August 10, 1978, or when enforcement was sought, December 19,
1978.118
Judge Garth, writing for the court, emphasized that criminal and
civil investigations were almost always intertwined and that by
proving the existence of a criminal investigation, the taxpayer does
not sustain the burden of negating a civil investigation. Finally, the
court stated that a notation by an IRS official on a letter to the
United States Attorney stating "I would hope that this case will
result in prosecution" did not show the Service's institutional pos-
ture but was merely the attitude of the official."1 "
In spite of the fairly liberal discovery outlined in Genser II, the
114. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
115. 616 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1980).
116. United States v. First Nat'l State Bank, 469 F. Supp. 612 (D.N.J. 1979). The dis-
trict court decision discussed the difficulties in trying to ascertain "institutional posture"
and stated that the "net practical effect may be that the forecast of the minority in LaSalle
(which would not have allowed any inquiry so long as the summons is issued before referral)
will become a reality. . . ." Id. at 618.
117. 616 F.2d at 672.
118. Id. (footnote omitted).
119. Id. at 673.
[Vol. IX
INSTITUTIONAL POSTURE
emerging Third Circuit test generally confines its examination of
institutional posture to the time the summons was issued. This in-
quiry is accompanied by a strict application of the LaSalle test
requiring the taxpayer to show that the summons is without any
civil tax purpose. 2 0
B. Second Circuit
In United States v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 12 ' the Second
Circuit employed an objective test in examining the validity of a
section 7602 summons. '22 The court found the section 7602 sum-
monses issued by the special agent to be valid as long as they were
issued prior to a recommendation to the Department of Justice for
criminal prosecution. The court noted that even allowing limited
discovery on the issue of bad faith would require the taxpayer to
make a "substantial preliminary showing" of misuse.1 2 8
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the case was re-
manded to the district court 2 4 in order to resolve the enforcement
proceedings. Although the Second Circuit had required enforce-
ment, the intervenors argued that LaSalle required a different re-
sult. The district court observed that the LaSalle court had re-
jected a single objective test and instead recognized that in the
absence or delay of a formal recommendation to the Department
of Justice, it was incumbent upon the taxpayer to demonstrate an
institutional posture on the part of the Service tantamount to
abandonment of all civil proceedings in order to render a section
7602 summons invalid.1 28 The district court noted that a factual
inquiry was necessary to determine institutional posture and that
the Second Circuit preferred to satisfy this inquiry with affidavits
120. United States v. Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc., 484 F. Supp. 884 (D.N.J. 1980); United
States v. Snyder, 470 F. Supp. 77 (W.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. DiOrio, 484 F. Supp. 22
(E.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. Met-Fin Co., Inc., 79.1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9386 (E.D.
Pa. 1979).
121. 572 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978). This case was decided
while LaSalle was pending before the Supreme Court. Id. at 39.
122. The objective test was the Second Circuit's interpretation of Donaldson, which was
favored by the LaSalle dissent. See notes 68-69 supra and accompanying text.
123. Id. at 42-43 n.9.
124. United States v. European Am. Bank and Trust Co., 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1
9201 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
125. Id. at 86,356.
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rather than with a full evidentiary hearing wherever possible. "
The district court found the affidavits submitted by the special
agent, in which he indicated that neither he nor the Service had
yet recommended criminal prosecution, to be sufficient and
granted enforcement.
In United States v. Marine Midland Bank, 27 the Second Cir-
cuit was asked to determine at what point the IRS institutionally
abandons its pursuit of civil tax liability and collection. In Marine
Midland the court found that some time after issuance of the sec-
tion 7602 summonses the IRS had recommended criminal prosecu-
tion to its Regional Counsel's Office. Noting that after LaSalle a
taxpayer's ability to resist a summons where no recommendation
had been made to the Department of Justice was limited, the Sec-
ond Circuit determined that the taxpayer was entitled to some as-
sistance from the government in establishing its own institutional
posture. The court remanded the proceeding for a determination
as to "the point to which criminal recommendations have gone and
the extent to which civil collection efforts are continuing at the
time of consideration of applications for enforcement orders ."
(emphasis added). The Second Circuit decided that an IRS affida-
vit would be sufficient to establish institutional posture.
The factual circumstances of Marine Midland mirror the second
time frame outlined in Garden State,12 9 that is, where some type of
intra-agency referral has been made. The Second Circuit's decision
to examine institutional posture at time of enforcement indicates
that good faith issuance alone is insufficient to support the validity
of a section 7602 summons in light of an intra-agency referral.
On remand,1 80 the government argued that the Second Circuit
incorrectly directed the district court to discern the Service's insti-
tutional posture at time of enforcement rather than at time of issu-
ance. Although the district court acknowledged that precedent
seemed to indicate time of issuance to be the significant date, the
Second Circuit had specifically indicated its concern with institu-
126. Id. at 86,356 n.5.
127. 585 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978).
128. Id. at 39.
129. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
130. United States v. Marine Midland Bank, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9590
(W.D.N.Y. 1979).
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tional posture at time of enforcement. The district court stated
that the affidavit of the District Counsel of the IRS did not pro-
vide particulars of the agent's activities or any information from
which the district court could determine whether the Service had
abandoned its civil tax goals. The affidavit had stated that the rev-
enue agent was assigned to the audit in October 1975 but that no
income tax deficiencies had been assessed, and as of December 15,
1978, the audit was not complete. The district court rejected the
taxpayer's request for an evidentiary hearing and instead called for
an affidavit from the revenue agent setting forth the extent to
which his investigation had progressed as of the date that the en-
forcement proceedings were submitted for consideration by the
district court. 8 1
In United States v. Chemical Bank,13 2 the Second Circuit distin-
guished Marine Midland, wherein it was conceded that a criminal
prosecution was under way, from a situation where the Depart-
ment of Justice was coordinating an ongoing investigation. After
examining the procedures used to coordinate such an investigation,
the Second Circuit determined that the Service's participation did
not make it an information-gathering agency and did not violate
the good faith use of the section 7602 administrative summons.
Furthermore, based upon a government affidavit, it was deter-
mined that no evidence was transmitted from the IRS to the De-
partment of Justice. In response to the taxpayer's allegation that
IRS abandonment should be inferred because the audit had been
in progress two and one-half years before the summons was issued
and during that period no assessments or determinations of civil
liability were made, the court replied that lengthy examinations
were not unusual and the Service's continuing investigation of the
taxpayer raised no presumptions.'
In Chemical Bank, the Second Circuit did not find that a recom-
mendation for prosecution had been delayed. However, in United
States v. Chase Manhattan Bank,"' the Second Circuit ques-
tioned the motive for a delay in recommending criminal prosecu-
tion in an examination initiated on the basis of information pro-
131. Id. at 88,148.
132. 593 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979).
133. Id. at 458 n.7.
134. 598 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1979).
1980]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
vided from the FBI which was pursuing its own investigation.
Although it was undisputed that the Service had not furnished any
information to the FBI, the Second Circuit found it necessry to
remand the proceeding for limited discovery to determine the na-
ture of the delay in the taxpayer's "imminent" indictment. 5 On '
remand," 6 the district court found that both the FBI and the De-
partment of Justice investigations against the taxpayer had been
closed two months prior to the issuance of the summons. The sum-
mons was therefore enforced by the district court and affirmed on
appeal.1 37
In both Chemical Bank and Chase Manhattan, the Second Cir-
cuit focused its consideration on the use of the summons and the
extent to which any parallel or joint investigation had progressed
at the time of the proceedings. No special emphasis was placed
upon institutional posture at the time of issuance or enforcement.
In United States v. O'Henry's Film Works, Inc.,13 ' the Second
Circuit rejected a taxpayer's argument that the IRS institutionally
acted in bad faith. " ' The taxpayer contended that the affidavits
prepared for the initial enforcement proceeding did not represent
the present purpose of the IRS because of the lapse of time be-
tween the preparation of the affidavits and the actual proceedings.
The Second Circuit, however, stated that the timing of the affida-
vits standing alone was insufficient to create a substantial prelimi-
nary showing of institutional bad faith which would justify discov-
ery on the issue of the Service's purpose.14 0 The O'Henry court was
135. Id. at 327.
The limited discovery was to be "either in the form of affidavits from other government
officials or in the form of limited interrogatories to those who have already offered affidavits
• * * to determine if the non-tax criminal indictment of the taxpayer is being held up pend-
ing, or is in any improper way connected to, compliance with the summons sought to be
enforced." Id. at 327-28.
136. United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9658
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
137. United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9355 (2d Cir.
1980).
138. 598 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1979).
139. The Second Circuit, however, did not enforce the summons in O'Henry on fifth
amendment grounds. For a discussion of this constitutional defense, see Kenderdine, The
Internal Revenue Service Summons to Produce Documents: Powers, Procedure, and Tax-
payer Defenses, 64 MINN. L. REV. 73, 89-99 (1979); Comment, Use of the Summons, Inter-
vention, and Constitutional Rights, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 135, 158-84 (1974).
140. 598 F.2d at 320.
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concerned that requiring the government to submit a series of up-
dated affidavits attesting to its institutional posture would create
"endless discovery proceedings" envisioned by the dissent in
LaSalie.14 1
In any event, O'Henry makes it clear that the taxpayer must
make a substantial preliminary showing of either institutional bad
faith, or misuse of the summons power, or at least establish that a
recommendation for criminal prosecution has been made at some
level. This level may even be only within the IRS in order to inval-
idate the summons. Absent any of these circumstances, the sum-
mons would be on a par with Garden State's. third time frame
which the Third Circuit regards as "virtually unassailable.' ' 42
However, unlike the Third Circuit's broader discovery rule out-
lined as "minimum" in Genser 1,1 " the Second Circuit will grant
only limited discovery upon a substantial preliminary showing by
the taxpayer"' and will otherwise rely heavily upon disclosure
through government affidavits. " 5
C. Fourth Circuit
In United States v. McGuirt,"6 the Fourth Circuit ordered the
enforcement of section 7602 summonses stating that an enforce-
ment petition accompanied by an affidavit asserting the continuing
good faith purpose of the Service prior to any institutional referral
for criminal prosecution to the Department of Justice created a
prima facie showing sufficient to warrant enforcement.14 7
Although the Court did not cite Marine Midland, the case which initiated the practice of
examining institutional posture as of the date of consideration of the application for en-
forcement proceedings, it would appear that the age of the affidavits is irrelevant as long as
the affidavit reflects the posture of the Service on the date the matter of enforcement was
submitted for consideration by the district court.
141. 437 U.S. at 320.
142. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
143. See United States v. Ryan, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9269 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This
case analyzes the scope of permissible discovery in enforcement proceedings in the Second,
Third and Fifth Circuits. See note 86 supra.
144. United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d at 42-43 n.9.
145. United States v. Marine Midland Bank, 585 F.2d at 38-39.
The First Circuit also holds that government affidavits may be sufficient to prove institu-
tional posture. United States v. Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316, 321 (1st Cir. 1979); United
States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 329 (D. Mass. 1979).
146. 588 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979).
147. Id. at 421.
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Similarly, in United States v. Equitable Trust Co.,148 the Fourth
Circuit noted that the special agent testified that no recommenda-
tion had been made by the IRS to the Department of Justice for
criminal prosecution. In Equitable Trust it was alleged that the
purpose of certain tax investigations was to pressure taxpayers into
cooperating in a tax investigation of the intervenor, who was
named in the summons but was not the object of the particular
examination. In support of this contention, the intervenor alleged
that the special agent had discussed immunity with the other tax-
payers. The court, however, enforced the summons, stating that
no recommendations have seemingly been made by IRS to the Department
of Justice for criminal prosecution of any of the persons under investigation.
There are no allegations that the IRS is not interested in the civil aspects of
the tax liability of [the parties questioned]. There are only allegations of
bad faith because of the failure to warn targets or potential targets, and
because of the discussion of immunity . .
The court admitted that the district court might have required
more details from the IRS concerning the particulars of the inves-
tigations, but concluded that if there were no basis for the civil tax
investigations of the other taxpayers the burden was on intervenor
to so demonstrate this.
Both McGuirt and Equitable Trust indicate that when the IRS
submits an affidavit asserting that no formal recommendation has
been made to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution,
the government has provided sufficient evidence of good faith.
There is no discussion in the cases of intra-agency referrals as indi-
cations of institutional posture to establish good or bad faith.150
The difficulties with a strict application of the LaSalle test and
148. 611 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1979).
149. Id. at 500.
150. The sufficiency of such affidavits has been questioned by Judge Widener concurring
in United States v. McGuirt, 588 F.2d at 422.
I do not think the affidavits which were the only evidence before the district court,
and upon which the cases was decided, meet the requirements of LaSalle because
they do not even address the subject of the institutional commitment of the Internal
Revenue Service with respect to a prosecution, other than that no recommendation to
prosecute had been made, and do not mention any facts from which could be decided
the matter of... "delay in submitting a recommendation to the Justice Department
when there is an institutional commitment to make the referral and the Service
merely would like to gather additional evidence for the prosecution."
Id. (citing United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. at 317)).
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with ascertainment of institutional posture are illustrated in the
district court case of United States v. Clark.15 1 In Clark, sum-
monses issued after a criminal investigation had ceased were en-
forced after the same criminal investigation was revived. Techni-
cally, the summonses met the objective test of LaSalle because
they were issued prior to any recommendation to the Department
of Justice. The Clark court stated that it found "no indication that
the IRS, in an institutional sense, has decided to recommend crim-
inal prosecution .. " 2 The court equated institutional posture,
which is a good faith inquiry, with the objective test that requires
the summons be issued prior to a formal agency referral from the
IRS to the Department of Justice.
D. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has determined that the validity of an admin-
istrative summons is measured as of the date of its issuance."'3 Ad-
hering to this proposition, the district courts of the Fifth Circuit
have applied the LaSalle test by comparing the date of issuance of
the summons with the date the IRS makes its formal referral to
the Department of Justice.154
In United States v. Ladd,155 District Judge Porter validated a
section 7602 summons finding that at the time of issuance, the IRS
had made no recommendation to the Department of Justice. The
court stated that "the controlling date is not the date the agent
recommends prosecution to the IRS, but the date the IRS recom-
151. 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9210 (M.D.N.C. 1979).
152. Id. at 83,328.
153. United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 (5th Cir. 1978). This is a pre-LaSalle
decision.
154. Accord, United States v. Central Nat'l Bank, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) V 9284
(N.D. Ohio 1980). A district court in the Sixth Circuit originally required a supplemental
affidavit from the IRS.
In light of the great lapse of time since the hearing ... it is possible that the institu-
tional posture of IRS has changed with respect to recommending a criminal prosecu-
tion of [the taxpayer]. Therefore, a supplemental affidavit of the investigating agent
should be filed . . . to indicate whether or not the IRS has recommended to the Jus-
tice Department that there be criminal prosecution. ...
Id. at 83,608. However, the court later reconsidered, stating that "the supplemental affidavit
requested is unnecessary since the validity of the summonses is to be determined as of the
date of their issuance." Id.
155. 471 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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mends prosecution to the Department of Justice." 1"6 Furthermore,
in United States v. Lipshy,157 the same court determined that "[a]
later recommendation will not of itself establish that at the time of
issuance the IRS had abandoned its pursuit of civil tax determina-
tion."'5 8 The district court in Lipshy did not specify any other fac-
tors that would establish abandonment nor did it specify the time
perspective from which other factors would have to be considered.
Applying the LaSalie test in the manner suggested by Ladd and
Lipshy narrows the time at which institutional posture could be
examined and therefore makes the good faith inquiry more man-
ageable; however, this method may not yield a satisfactory result
in all cases. In United States v. First State Bank,59 a district
court enforced a summons despite the taxpayer's claim that the
investigation was really concerned with narcotics activities. The
agent testified that no recommendation for criminal prosecution
had been made and the court found nothing in the agent's diary
that would indicate that the investigation was solely criminal in
nature. However, the court expressed concern that the agent's di-
ary did not indicate circumstances which would warrant a seven
month delay between the issuance of the summons and the peti-
tion for enforcement.160
E. Eighth Circuit
In United States v. Schutterle,'' the Eighth Circuit reviewed
taxpayers' convictions for wilful failure to file income tax returns
for three years. The taxpayers at trial made a motion to suppress
evidence obtained by means of a section 7602 summons. 6 " The
156. Id. at 1161.
157. 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9628 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
158. Id. at 88,283.
159. 481 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D. Ga. 1980).
160. Id. at 1307. In spite of the Fifth Circuit's fairly overall objective test, a § 7602
summons was denied enforcement in an examination initiated under the Service's Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP). In United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 468 F.
Supp. 415 (N.D. Tex. 1979), the district court found that the primary purpose of the audit
was research into compliance with Code provisions and the secondary purpose was the accu-
racy of the return. See note 176 infra.
161. 586 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1978).
162. The summons was issued prior to February 28, 1977 and therefore not subject to
IRC § 7609, which authorizes notice and right of intervention to parties named in the sub-
poenaed documents. See notes 24 and 25 supra and accompanying text.
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taxpayers also alleged abuse of process with regard to an earlier
enforcement proceeding, claiming that the summons had been ju-
dicially enforced less than three months after it was issued. 63 The
special agent testified at the suppression hearing that he had not
recommended criminal prosecution until over a year after the sum-
mons had been enforced. Shortly after that recommendation, the
IRS forwarded a formal recommendation to the Department of
Justice.
In response to the defendants' contentions, the Eighth Circuit,
while acknowledging that LaSalle was decided after the taxpayers'
trial, noted that there was sufficient evidence from which to con-
clude that the LaSalle test was satisfied. Citing LaSalle the Eighth
Circuit stated "Uludicial enforcement of the summons is proper
only if it was issued in good faith, before the Service has aban-
doned in an institutional sense civil tax determination or collection
purposes, and prior to any recommendation by the Service to the
Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.' 64 However, the
Schutterle court went on to state "that at the time the summons
was enforced the IRS had not abandoned civil tax pursuits and
had not committed itself to prosecution." 65
In United States v. Richter,' the taxpayers contended that a
district court erred in limiting their ability to prove institutional
bad faith by preventing the taxpayers from questioning two special
agents about an attempted entry of the taxpayers' home and about
surveillance of the taxpayers. The district court also quashed the
taxpayers' subpoena for examining the IRS investigatory file, al-
though the district court did examine the file in camera. The tax-
payers, while acknowledging that they bore the burden of proving
the Service's institutional posture rather than the special agents'
personal motives, argued that if taxpayers could not examine IRS
investigatory files "the burden of proving a solely criminal 'institu-
tional posture,' which LaSalle placed upon them, was impossible
to meet.'
67
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision enforc-
163. 586 F.2d at 1202.
164. Id. at 1203 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 1204 (emphasis added).
166. 603 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1979).
167. Id. at 747.
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ing the summons and found the rulings concerning the conduct of
the special agents to be correct. The Eighth Circuit emphasized
that its decision was based on evidence established at the suppres-
sion hearing and not on the district court's in camera inspection of
the IRS case file. The court was further convinced that from the
testimony it was established that the Service fulfilled the LaSalle
test in that no recommendation for criminal prosecution had been
made. In effect, the taxpayers failed to negate the existence of a
civil tax purpose; therefore, the court granted enforcement. 1 8
Similarly, in United States v. Moon,169 the Eighth Circuit
affirmed enforcement of a summons. In Moon, the special agent's
affidavit in support of enforcement indicated that two months af-
ter the date enforcement proceedings had been brought, neither he
nor the IRS had recommended any criminal prosecution against
the taxpayer. 17 0 The Eighth Circuit found that the Service had es-
tablished a prima facie case for enforcement consisting of a peti-
tion for enforcement and a sworn declaration of the agent.17, The
court stated that the good faith showing required for enforcement
could be made with the agent's affidavit despite the fact that the
agent's personal good faith was less relevant than the Service's in-
stitutional posture.17 2
The Eighth Circuit also approved the district court's denial of
the taxpayer's motion for discovery. The court relying on Morgan
Guaranty stated:
There is no unqualified right to pretrial discovery in a proceeding to enforce
an IRS summons and, indeed, discovery is the exception rather than the
rule. An application of discovery rules which would destroy the summary
nature of enforcement proceedings is not required. The use of traditional
pretrial discovery mechanisms in summons enforcement proceedings is lim-
ited to those cases where the taxpayer makes a substantial preliminary
showing of abuse as a prerequisite to even limited discovery. 178
The Eighth Circuit's analysis of LaSalle is in accord with the
Second Circuit's in its requirement that a taxpayer make a sub-
168. Id. at 748.
169. 616 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1980).
170. Id. at 1045.
171. Id. at 1046.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1047 (citations omitted).
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stantial preliminary showing of institutional bad faith before even
limited discovery is granted. Furthermore, with respect to the
point in time at which institutional posture is examined,
Schutterle,'7'4 Richter and Moon all indicate the Eighth Circuit's
concern for the status of the civil case and possible criminal recom-
mendation at the time of the enforcement proceedings. However,
in United States v. National Bank of South Dakota,'7 5 the Eighth
Circuit noted only the time of issuance in reference to the status of
any possible criminal investigation, and did not indicate whether
any recommendation had actually been made subsequent to the is-
suance of the summons.'
7
F. Tenth Circuit
A survey of Tenth Circuit decisions concerning investigations in
which neither the IRS nor the examining agent had commenced or
recommended criminal prosecution supports the conclusion
reached by the Third Circuit that a summons issued at this early
stage would be "virtually unassailable.' ' 77
174. It is interesting to note that in United States v. Lipshy, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9628 (N.D. Tex. 1979) at 88,284, the district court cites Schutterle as supporting the pro-
position that the controlling date is the date the IRS recommends prosecution to the De-
partment of Justice and not the date the agent recommends prosecution to the IRS.
175. 620 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1980).
176. Worthy of note is the district court case of United States v. Flagg, 80-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9125 (S.D. Iowa 1979). In that case, a summons was issued for an audit initi-
ated by the Service's Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP). The district
court found the Service's motive to be research rather than investigative. The agent testified
"that while the 'sole' purpose of ever looking at this taxpayer's return was the T.C.M.P.
program, that after that choice was made, the person examining had a new purpose, to see if
the return Was correct." Id. at 83,089. The court however, found that "[t]his is not the same
as a dual purpose at the inception of the issuance [of the summons] as contemplated by
LaSalle." Id. The district court denied enforcement of the summons.,
See United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 468 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Tex. 1979) decided prior to
Flagg, where the district court ruled against enforcement in an identical case. See note 160
supra.
177. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
For other Tenth Circuit cases upholding IRS summonses after the Service made a prima
facie showing, see: United States v. Fahey, 614 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Baker, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9144 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Traynor, 611 F.2d
809 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. MacKay, 608 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Fetter, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9675 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. First Nat'l
Bank, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9674 (10th Cir. 1979).
In discussing the taxpayer's burden of proof, Chief Judge. Winner's opinion in United
States v. Shivlock, 459 F. Supp. 1383 (D. Colo. 1978), aff'd sub nom. United States v. In-
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
A prima facie showing, according to the Tenth Circuit, consists
of testimony by the agent who issued the summons that no crimi-
nal case has been recommended or commenced, and an analysis
showing that the IRS has met the good faith requirements of Pow-
ell.17 8 Once this standard is met, and before any recommendation
as to a criminal prosecution is made, a civil tax purpose is pre-
sumed. For example, in United States v. Ohmohundro,7 9 a tax-
payer argued that the burden of proof had shifted to the govern-
ment to show a civil tax purpose after the government had
"acknowledged that the summoned information may ultimately
have some potential use in a criminal context."1 80 The Tenth Cir-
cuit disagreed and stated that once the Service has made a prima
facie showing under LaSalle and Powell, nothing further is
required.
The Tenth Circuit also follows the Second and Eighth Circuits
in limiting the scope of discovery in enforcement proceedings. In
United States v. Southern Tanks Inc., 8 ' an investigation was re-
ferred to a special agent, following a one year audit by a revenue
agent, in order to determine whether criminal violations had oc-
curred. The special agent issued a section 7602 summons to the
corporate taxpayer and its president. At an evidentiary hearing
before a magistrate, the government satisfied the prerequisites for
enforcement of the summons; 82 the defendants nevertheless de-
manded that the government produce the revenue agent's time
sheets in order to determine his level of civil audit activity imme-
diately prior to the referral to the special agent for criminal inves-
come Realty and Mortgage, Inc., 612 F.2d 1224 (10th Cir. 1979), contains an aside which
states:
I am unconvinced that LaSalle doesn't narrow Powel rather than broaden it, because
LaSalle speaks in terms of overall bad motive on the part of the agency rather than
the agent. LaSalle places almost total reliance on the checks and balances within the
IRS and it limits a court's inquiry to institutional bad faith-a burden of proof which
I suspect is probably more nearly "impossible" rather than just "a heavy one."
Id. at 1390.
178. See notes 36 and 58 supra and accompanying text.
179. 619 F.2d 51 (10th Cir. 1980).
180. Id. at 53.
181. 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9317 (10th Cir. 1980).
182. The case does not explicitly state how the government made this prima facie show-
ing. However, it appears that it was made either upon the testimony or the affidavits of the
agents.
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tigation8'5 The defendants argued that this information would
help establish that the civil tax purpose had been abandoned. The
Tenth Circuit, in denying this request, stated that the record sup-
plied sufficient indication of a continuing civil tax purpose and fur-
thermore, that the Service "firmly denied that there had been a
recommendation for prosecution made to the Department of Jus-
tice or that there was any intention to do so. ''184 The court ac-
cepted this showing as sufficient to satisfy the LaSalle test.
V. Conclusion
While the clearly objective test called for by the LaSalle dissent-
ers would have greatly simplified tax administration, the Supreme
Court has been unwilling to forego the good faith inquiry into the
Internal Revenue Service's use of its section 7602 summons power
and has therefore imposed a test of institutional posture. 18 After
LaSalle, it is clear that the motive of the investigating agent does
not control institutional posture, 86 but it is unclear at what level
within the IRS institutional posture can be ascertained,8 7 or ex-
actly how it should be ascertained. A majority of the circuits have
stated that the IRS may make a prima facie showing based upon
an enforcement petition accompanied by an agent's affidavit. How-
ever, with few exceptions,'s the circuit courts do not specify what
183. Id. at 83,741.
184. Id. at 83,742.
185. 437 U.S. at 316-18, nn.18 & 19.
186. Id. at 316.
187. The meaning of the decisive phrase "institutional commitment" was left unclear
in the Court's opinion, and presumably will have to be expanded in subsequent cases.
What does seem clear is that an exploration into whether there has been an "institu-
tional commitment" provides a fertile ground for dispute between the taxpayer and
the Commissioner. If there has been an institutional commitment by the IRS, it most
likely will have been evidenced by internal memos, notes of conferences, and the like
between various layers of the IRS. Once a taxpayer has made an initial showing of
failure by the IRS to satisfy section 7602 (which may be exceedingly difficult to do),
he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and to discovery and cross-examination to
determine whether a summons has been issued in good faith. In order to test for the
presence or absence of institutional commitment on the part of the IRS, an extensive
examination of the Special Agent, the chain of his reviewers and superiors and their
files might very well be necessary.
Walter, The Battle for Information: Strategies of Taxpayer and the IRS to Compel (or
Resist) Disclosure, 56 TAxEs 740, 749 (1978).
188. The Third Circuit has set forth minimum discovery requirements. See note 86
supra.
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information must be set forth in the affidavit in order to make a
prima facie showing of good faith. Furthermore, in view of the
LaSalle requirement that the IRS use its summons power in good
faith at all times,1 89 it is unclear whether an affidavit attesting to
good faith issuance is sufficient. Confining the examination of in-
stitutional posture to the time of issuance only, without considera-
tion of pending intra-agency referrals and without examination of
institutional posture at the time of enforcement, disregards the
fact that there may already be sufficient evidence to warrant a re-
ferral for criminal prosecution. Under these circumstances, the ad-
ditional material sought, although serving a civil tax determination
purpose, may also have significant use in a subsequent criminal
case, possibly even enlarging the scope of the criminal charges. 190
The burdens placed upon the taxpayer to prove that the "sole
objective of the summons is a criminal purpose" and that the IRS
has "abandoned any civil tax purpose in an institutional sense" are
almost impossible 91 to overcome in view of the narrow permissible
discovery allowed in enforcement proceedings. In the absence of
egregious behavior or blatant bad faith on the part of the IRS, tax-
payers will seldom, if ever, prevail. In spite of these disproportion-
ate burdens it may be possible in circuits with either wider discov-
ery rules or more specific requirements as to the contents of
supporting affidavits or even in those circuits willing to examine
189. 437 U.S. at 318.
190. See Note, IRS Use of the Civil Summons Power: The Institutional Good Faith
Requirement - United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 469; 479
(1979).
191. The Supreme Court characterizes this burden as "heavy." 437 U.S. at 316.
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institutional posture at times other than issuance, for taxpayers to
be persuaded as to the Internal Revenue Service's genuine good
faith. The ultimate goal would be to provide for fair administration
of the tax laws without resorting to a purely mechanical or objec-
tive test.192
Monice Rosenbaum
192. An examination of Second and Third Circuit cases has led one commentator to
conclude that
LaSalle has failed to achieve that for which it was intended-a clear and desirably
accurate standard for determining when the Internal Revenue Service summons is
being used improperly for a purely criminal purpose. The concept of "institutional
bad faith" has caused continued confusion. The summons is a civil process which is
used in the field by individual agents with specific purposes in mind and not by ab-
stract institutions. Although theoretically a civil thread may be intertwined in every
criminal tax investigation, this fact should not foreclose an analysis into the specific
purpose for the issuance of a specific summons. Shortly before LaSalle, Congress en-
acted Title 26, United States Code Section 7609 guaranteeing to taxpayers the power
to intervene and object in summons enforcement proceedings brought against third
party record keepers. This legislation resulted from a demand that there be indepen-
dent court review of the Service's use of its summons power. However, the restrictive
test formulated in LaSalle may undermine Congress' intent and may result in the
paradoxical situation of a Congressionally created remedy for a Court denied right.
Fink, Internal Revenue Service Summons Power, 38 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 19-1, 19-29
(1980).
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